New publication: The Teaching of the Trivium at Bec and Its Bearing on Anselm’s Programme of Fides Quaerens Intellectum

Publication link: https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004716308_006

Preprint: https://www.academia.edu/15012500/The_trivium_at_Bec_and_its_bearing_on_Anselms_programme_of_fides_quaerens_intellectum

This publication arose out of a need for the different areas of Anselm studies, across theology, philosophy, history and manuscript work, to communicate with each other much more than is currently the norm. By placing the Proslogion in the light of Boethian logical texts known since Becker (1885) to have been housed at Bec, the paper shows through an analysis of Anselm’s most famous chapters from the Proslogion exactly how the text should be understood as an example of fides quaerens intellectum, faith seeking understanding. This in turn helps us to understand exactly what these terms, faith and reason, mean in Anselm without presupposing either the tension or the separation between them that colors their present semantics.

Abstract:

How should the phrase ‘fides quaerens intellectum’ be understood as a characterization of Anselm’s Proslogion? I argue that ‘fides’ and ‘intellectum’ should be understood not in accordance with the standard meanings we assign to ‘faith’ and ‘understanding’ today, but in accordance with their meaning in works used to teach grammar and dialectic at Bec in and around Anselm’s lifetime. I begin by making the structures behind the usual understanding of ‘faith’ and ‘understanding’ explicit. From here, I detail the works of the Trivium used at Bec according to a 12th century library list, and provide justification for thinking these same works were used slightly earlier, in Anselm’s time. Next, I show how the terms fides and intellectus functioned in these works. Finally, I show how these considerations illuminate Anselm’s Proslogion and the exchange with Gaunilo.

The problem of evil does not exist

Thesis

The existence of evil does not constitute evidence against the existence of God. On the contrary, it constitutes a condition without which God could not be God, and hence could not exist.

Argument

The conditions necessary for the possibility of an object existing do not contradict those necessary for the possibility of understanding the concept of that object:

Therefore, the conditions necessary for the possibility of a god existing do not contradict those necessary for the possibility of understanding the concept ‘God’.

But a standard condition assumed necessary for the possibility of god’s existence, namely, a world in which there neither was nor can be any evil, is one in which it is impossible to grasp the concept ‘god’.

Therefore, a world in which there neither was nor can be evil is not a condition necessary for the possibility of god’s existence.

Exposition

The condition of a world in which in which there neither was nor can be any evil is one in which it is impossible to grasp the concept ‘God’. That is, a world in which it is possible to grasp the concept ‘god’ is one in which there was or can be evil.

Proof: I am not concerned here with more philosophical definitions of God, but with a simple one present in every popular theistic religion: by a god, I mean a being to which one should pray. The two chief forms of prayer are petition and gratitude. Petition presupposes the possibility of deprivation. Gratitude presupposes the avoidance of possible deprivation. Deprivation is evil. Without evil, there is thus no concept of prayer; without prayer, no concept of God. Thus, the existence of evil cannot constitute evidence against the existence of God, as a matter of principle.

Corollaries

Eternity is not, strictly speaking, a world distinct from this. If the saints give thanks, it is because they have known evil. If they petition, it is because evil is possible.

The formulation of problem of evil requires some distance from evil itself. This is empirically confirmed by the growth of atheism in proportion with material comfort, i.e. the existence of atheism as essentially a bourgeois phenomenon.

God is called a father, as one who supports and protects; one in heaven, for the altogether simple reason that that is whence the sun and rain come, without which there is no life.