Paris, BN, lat. 16130, ff. 118va-120vb. “A second anonymous early 14th c. treatise on consequences (ante 1315).”
London, BL, Royal 12 FXIX, ff. 111ra-112rb. “An anonymous early 14th c. treatise on consequences (c. 1302).”
Duns Scotus. “Scotus on the Domain of Logic: A translation of Scotus’ Questions on Porphyry’s Isagoge, qq. 1-3.”
Anselm of Canterbury. “Proslogion 2-4 and Prayer to Christ.”
2 thoughts on “Translations”
My name is Chethan G Nair . I am an Indian. I am studying BA Multimedia.
In the translation I noticed a sentence which seems to me as a mistake. If it is not a mistake please explain the meaning of it. The sentence is given below.
10. Again, the manner of knowing is posterior to knowing; therefore, it is posterior to knowledge (scientia), for knowing is posterior to knowledge.
(Should it be ‘prior’ instead of ‘posterior’ in the above sentence of your translation.)
For long time I was waiting for an english translation of any one of the following commentary-
Commentary on Isagoge by Albertus Magnus,. Commentary on Isagoge by Boethius, Commentary on Isagoge by Duns Scotus, but without these i am not able to understand Isagoge by Porphyry which is the first book to be studied while learning philosophy.
Sir I dont know latin , so if you have any spare time can you please consider translating the complete book – Scotus’s Questions on Porphyry’s Isagoge.
Chethan G Nair
Scotus’ Latin has ‘posterior’. The basic idea he seems to be trying to convey in saying, for instance, that ‘the mode of knowing is posterior to knowing’, is that I come to know a thing before I come to know how I know it. The latter is only achieved after a specific reflection upon the initial act of knowing.
In saying that ‘the manner of knowing is posterior to knowledge’, I take Scotus to be relying on a notion of knowledge, or scientia, that takes it to be what is had in knowing. Hence, it primarily signifies the object of a science as such. Insofar as the object of a science is what is grasped and aimed at in knowing (i.e. the cognitive act), it cannot be itself be dependent upon that act, but must be higher than it. In brief, knowing presupposes the prior existence of the known. Conversely, knowing is posterior to knowledge.